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INTRODUCTION

Debate among bankruptcy scholars about the purpose of
bankruptcy reorganization has been ongoing and strident.' The
1. John D. Ayer, So Near To Cleveland, So Far From God: An Essay on the Ethnography of Bankruptcy, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 407 (1992) (detailing the debate among commentators); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465 (detailing the debate among commentators).
For criticisms of the existing bankruptcy scheme and responses to those criticisms, see
Barry E. Alder, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Alder, Financial and Political] (proposing a chameleon equity structure and the elimination of the bankruptcy scheme); Barry E. Alder, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992) [hereinafter Alder, Bankruptcy
and Risk] (arguing contractual risk allocations outside of bankruptcy are superior to risk
allocation in bankruptcy); James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993) [hereinafter Bowers, Wisconsylvania] (responding to Warren's and LoPucki's criticisms of the
Bradley and Rosenzweig article); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable
Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050 (1992) (proposing the "extreme version of the
[economic,] 'market-based' solution to corporate bankruptcy": the repeal of Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code); Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and
Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1088 (1992) (arguing Chapter 11 has failed to achieve
its purposes); Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against CorporateReorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1993) (responding to Bradley and Rosenzweig article); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L.
REV. 729 [hereinafter LoPucki, Trouble] (arguing Chapter 11 process takes too long to be
successful in reorganizing companies); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange
World: A Reply to ProfessorsBradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992) [hereinafter LoPucki, Strange Visions] (responding to Bradley and Rosenzweig article); Elizabeth
Warren, "Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?", 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (1992)
[hereinafter Warren, Why] (arguing Chapter 11 is better than state law alternatives in
spreading losses caused by financial distress); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for
Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case] (responding to Bradley and Rosenzweig article).
For support of the creditors' bargain account and criticism of the non-economic account
of bankruptcy, see Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy:
A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution]
(arguing that the noneconomic, value-based account of bankruptcy law "rests on a number
of fairly simple propositions .. . [which] sound innocuous enough, but none of [which] can
withstand close scrutiny, and adher[ence] to [which] invites analysis that is unfocused and
misguided"); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy Case] (arguing that "the law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually impossible when
the debtor is a publicly held corporation"); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 399, 399-400 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson, Of Liquidation] (arguing that nonbankruptcy entitlement preservation should underlie bankruptcy policy, not "undefined consid-
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commentators' viewpoints of the purpose of bankruptcy influence
their approaches to resolution of particular substantive bankruptcy
issues.' The differing perspectives of the purpose of bankruptcy reerations of equity or notions of balancing"); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982) [hereinafter
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements] (arguing that non-bankruptcy entitlements should be recognized in bankruptcy using the "creditors' bargain" paradigm, which
views the bankruptcy system as designed to "mirror the agreement one would expect the
creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate .. .from an ex ante position"); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain,75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155-56 (1989) (arguing
for the creditors' bargain conceptual paradigm which provides that prebankruptcy entitlements "should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessary to maximize net asset distributions to the creditors as a group and never to accomplish purely distributional goals"
justified on the basis of "equity, wealth redistribution, or appeals to communitarian
values").
For criticisms of the creditors' bargain account of bankruptcy and support of the noneconomic account, see Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justificationfor Corporate Reorganizations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 117 (1991) (criticizing the economic account/creditor's
bargain paradigm for "not attach[ing] sufficient significance to the transaction costs involved in using the market to raise the capital necessary to reorganize a corporation's capital
structure"); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990)
[hereinafter Bowers, Groping and Coping] (criticizing creditors' bargain approach as ignoring debtor behavior); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law,
Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution,26 GA. L. REV. 27
(1991) [hereinafter Bowers, Murphy's Law] (criticizing both creditors' bargain and loss allocation theories); David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 453 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Theory] (evaluating and criticizing the creditors' bargain economic model); David G. Carlson, Game Theory and Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 219 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Game Theory] (criticism of Douglas Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate
Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991)); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality
in Bankruptcy Decision Making, 33 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 333, 335 (1992) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Value and Rationality] (criticizing the economic account as based on a "false
foundation"-simple wealth maximization-and arguing for a "value-based account" that
posits a bankruptcy law which exists to "create a context in which the economic and
noneconomic values of all those affected by financial distress" is addressed); Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717,
720-21 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values] (arguing that the purpose of
bankruptcy law is to respond to "the many aspects of financial distress-moral, political,
personal, social, and economic-and, in particular, to the grievances of those who are affected by financial distress" and describing the economic account of bankruptcy law as "impoverished"); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777, 813 (1987)
[hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy] (arguing that the purpose of bankruptcy law encompasses many competing and conflicting values in determining how loss should be distributed and describing economic analyses as "giv[ing] quick answers, but only by sliding past
the troublesome issues that pervade resolution of real problems").
2. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 127-29 (starting from the assumption that
the bankruptcy proceeding is best seen as the "creditors' bargain," and concluding that "the
entire law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually
impossible when the debtor is a publicly held corporation" because debt holders and equity
holders of a corporation would not agree to a reorganization before the fact if they had the
opportunity to bargain for such a contingency); David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bank-
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organization are based upon divergent visions.3 Each commentator
appears to have in mind a vision of what reorganization should accomplish and critiques current reorganization law for failing to fulfill that vision. Some scholars have argued that maximizing creditors' wealth should be the goal of bankruptcy law, and that current
law is inefficient because it fails to achieve this end.' Other scholars have argued that the goal of bankruptcy law is to respond to
financial distress, and suggest that any new legislation should reflect the plurality of interests affected by that distress. Each
writer then attempts to persuade the reader to adopt the writer's
vision as the correct vision for bankruptcy reorganization."
ruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987) (reviewing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986), suggesting that bankruptcy law's purpose can only be
discerned through "infinitely complex" jurisprudential explanations); Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 857-61 (starting from the assumption that
the debtor discharge-centered view of bankruptcy is incorrect historically, finding that
bankruptcy is an inherently collectivizing process that should be viewed as a creditors' bargain which is a "system designed to mirror the agreement ... from an ex ante position");
Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 156-58 (starting from an assumption that an enhanced
"creditors' bargain" paradigm should inform bankruptcy jurisprudence, and concluding that
such a model best ensures that assets are deployed to all claimants, thus satisfying the authors' view of the central goal of bankruptcy law); Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra
note 1, at 762 (assuming that bankruptcy law is a response to "financial distress," a phrase
that encompasses moral, political, personal, social, as well as economic, aspects of bankruptcy); Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1, at 796-97. Warren also starts from a
premise that
bankruptcy is a distributional process, the purpose of which can only be identified
by "[inquiring] into many issues, including who may be hurt by a business failure,
how they may be hurt, whether the hurt can be avoided, at what cost it can be
avoided, who is helped by the business failure, whether aid to those helped offsets
the injury to those hurt, who can effectively evaluate the risks of business failure,
who may have contributed to the business failure, how they may have contributed,
whether the contribution to failure serves other useful goals, who can best bear
the costs of business failure, and who expected to bear the costs of business failure-just to name a few."
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1, at 796-97.
3. See infra part II.
4. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS]; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1; Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations,
101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1; Jackson & Scott, supra
note 1; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for CorporateReorganization,83
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
5. Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1; see also Carlson, supra note 2;
Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianismand the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy
Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Contractarianism];Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1; Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1.
6. For example, Thomas H. Jackson espouses the creditors' bargain model as best embodying the bankruptcy policy of maximizing the deployment of assets to all claimants and
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Before one can imagine differing visions for bankruptcy, one
must have in mind a concept of what bankruptcy means. Perhaps,
at its most elementary level, bankruptcy is about readjusting the
relationships between and among a debtor and its creditors.7 That
readjustment has historically been accomplished in two different
ways-liquidation and reorganization.8 In a liquidation, the
debtor's assets are gathered and sold and the proceeds distributed
to creditors.9 The emphasis in a reorganization is on a restructuring of the debts and assets so that the business can continue operathen analyzes certain bankruptcy rules and argues that they reflect a normative view that is
consistent with the creditors' bargain model. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After
the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988).
Some in the academic community doubt whether anyone listens to (i.e., reads) these
normative debates. See Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801
(1991); Edward L. Rubin, What Does PrescriptiveLegal Scholarship Say and Who is Listening to It: A Response to ProfessorDan-Cohen, 63 U. COLo. L. REV. 731 (1992). In bankruptcy, it appears that some courts are listening; see, e.g., Rosner v. Worcester (In re
Worcester), 811 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Mother Hubbard, Inc., 152 B.R. 189,
196 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993). In addition, as one author has noted, the public attention to bankruptcy and the notoriety of big bankruptcy cases may cause Congress to take
another look at reorganization issues. Skeel, supra note 1, at 467-69, 521. Finally, the
amount of time and resources spent on Chapter 11 is staggering. Gordon Bermant et al., A
Day in the Life: The Federal Judicial Center's 1988-1989 Bankruptcy Court Time Study,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 491, 517 (1991); see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 176 (1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining
Over Equity's Share] (finding that from a sample of eleven large, publicly held corporations,
the time period from filing of the bankruptcy petition until confirmation of the plan of
reorganization took from .9 to 4.3 years, with 2.53 being the average); LoPucki, Trouble,
supra note 1, at 744 n.65 (in various cited studies, median time in reorganization for large
publicly held companies ranged from 16.2 months to 32 months).
7. See generally Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96
CoM. L.J. 160, 160-61 (1991); Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy,
67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1919) [hereinafter Levinthal, English Bankruptcy]; Louis E.
Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1917-18)
[hereinafter Levinthal, Early History]; Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1940); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,and
the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 5-39 (1986) (detailing the historical struggle between creditors and debtors as embodied in the bankruptcy laws).
8. For example, a reorganization generally has creditors voluntarily or forcibly agreeing to accept a fraction of their claims to be paid out over a period of time. Frimet, supra
note 7, at 185 (describing United States Bankruptcy Act of 1874); Levinthal, Early History,
supra note 7, at 243 (describing Italian compositions); James M. Olmstead, Bankruptcy A
Commercial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REv. 829, 839-40 (1902) (describing United States
Bankruptcy Act of 1874); Radin, supra note 7, at 4 (describing bankruptcy composition);
Charles J. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
325, 360-62 (1991) (describing United States Bankruptcy Act of 1874).
9. See generally Frimet, supra note 7, at 163; Levinthal, English Bankruptcy, supra
note 7, at 18-20; Tabb, supra note 8, at 329-33 (describing English bankruptcy law prior to
1705).
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tions. 10 The writers' visions differ significantly in evaluating when
the debtor and creditor relationship can be adjusted and what adjustments to that relationship should be allowed.11
Each writer's vision of the purpose of bankruptcy is based
upon various premises. In comparing and contrasting those premises, it is clear that each writer is starting from a different set of
values and beliefs and each writer travels the path to his or her
conclusion using their individualized experiences to interpret and
apply those values and beliefs.12 Thus, no one should be surprised
that each writer comes to different conclusions about the correct
vision for the bankruptcy law. Although many have focused on the
merits and demerits of each writer's conclusions, 3 the debate at
10. Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations,34 ARIz. L. REV. 89, 91-94 (1992); LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share, supra note 6, at 127-28; Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009,
1035-36 (1987); Roe, supra note 4, at 528.
The primary difference between a liquidation and a reorganization is what assets are
used to satisfy the creditors' claims. In a liquidation, all current assets are converted into
cash and distributed to creditors. In a reorganization, some existing assets may be converted
to cash. The main focus, however, is the use of the potential income stream to pay the
existing and future liabilities of the business. In a liquidation, that income stream is not
available because all of the assets are sold and no income stream is generated. In both a
liquidation and a reorganization, all debts will not be paid in full, that is, some liabilities are
discharged without full payment. With respect to reorganizations, see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)
(1988) (providing that confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan operates as a discharge). See also 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1141.01[4][a] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993); GEORGE M.
TREIFESTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, 436-37'(1988). With respect to liquidation, see 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) (providing that discharge relieves the debtor from all
debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under Chapter 7). See also 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, at § 727.01[1]; Treister, supra, at 310-14. Recent studies have suggested that current bankruptcy practice in particular cases involves aspects of both liquidation and reorganization. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 604-06
(1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns].
11. Providing a legal mechanism for readjusting debtor and creditor relationships is
only necessary in a credit based economy where the population tolerates some failure to
repay debts. If credit did not exist or if the population mores required all debt to be repaid
in full without exception, the legal system would not provide for any mechanism for debt
discharge. Professor Shuchman states as a premise that differences may occur in the felt
obligation to repay money. These differences are based on the different types of transactions
that give rise to the debt. For example, the obligation to repay a loan from a friend may
carry a different moral repayment imperative than the obligation to repay a debt owed to a
large commercial financial institution. Professor Shuchman believes that current bankruptcy
law ignores such psychological realities as immaterial. Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a
"Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 428-32 (1973).
12. See generally Thomas Morawetz, UnderstandingDisagreement, the Root Issue of
Jurisprudence:Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 371 (1992) (examining the nature of legal reasoning and the role justification
strategies, individual beliefs, and personal histories have in reasoning).
13. See Baird, Loss Distribution,supra note 1, at 817 (criticizing a non-economic ac-
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that level is doomed to go on endlessly.
This Article examines the two dominant bankruptcy reorganization theories: the creditors' bargain theory and the loss allocation
theory. After briefly explaining the major premises of each theory,
this Article attempts to peel away the layers of assumptions to expose the writers' underlying beliefs and values about the nature of
a person, the nature of community, the optimal method of distributing resources, and the optimal allocation of decision making
power. 4 Although based upon divergent belief and value systems,
the theorists attempt to support their respective theories and convince others of the deficiencies in the opposing theory using three
primary methods of justification. These primary justification methods are the appeal to the historical, the appeal to the empirical,
and the appeal to the normative. Those justification methods, however, do not convince the opposing theorists.1 5
The bankruptcy jurisprudential debate is a microcosm of a
larger jurisprudential debate. This larger debate has taken place
over many decades. At issue in this debate are the following questions: (i) is law a legitimate exercise of power; (ii) can we be certain
that the law is enforcing the "right" normative values; (iii) are the
legal decision makers following the law or are they injecting their
own values and beliefs into their decisions; and (iv) is the law just.
The bankruptcy jurisprudential debate is addressing the same issues, but merely using different nomenclature. Nothing about the
bankruptcy debate itself suggests that the answers to these questions in bankruptcy are more easily found than the answers to
these questions in the jurisprudential debate as a whole. Just as in
the bankruptcy debate, debate about the four jurisprudential questions themselves involve matters of beliefs and values. Different jurisprudential schools hold different beliefs about the appropriate
count of bankruptcy policy as "deriv[ing] what bankruptcy law ought to be from what it is,"
and asserting that the non-economic account is inappropriate because "one cannot derive
the normative from the positive"); Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 1, at 69-76 (criticizing those who assert that non-economic values might be served by bankruptcy policy that
seeks to promote "talk that makes someone feel better" as therapy for financial distress, and
that shortcomings ascribed to the economic account are actually shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code); Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 542-44 (relaying Carlson's criticism of the economic account of bankruptcy policy as failing to recognize that bankruptcy
law is the product of "social exigency, moral conflict, and political compromise," and for not
taking into account these complex practical origins of bankruptcy law); Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, supra note 1, at 797-804 (criticizing the economic account of bankruptcy policy as
being overly narrow and failing to take into account the distributional consequences of its
premises).
14. See infra part II.
15. See infra part III.
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answers to those four questions. 6
No matter which way the question is asked, either from a
bankruptcy perspective or from a jurisprudential perspective, if
enough layers are peeled away, what is left at the core is a set of
beliefs and values. These beliefs and values do not seem to be subject to the test of truth or falsity, but are really matters of individ17
ual faith and aspiration.
This Article attempts to start a bankruptcy jurisprudential
conversation with the admission that we do not know the truth,
that we cannot discover the truth, and thus, in law, we cannot enact the truth. All that we have are unprovable beliefs, unsupportable values, and an unshakable faith in what would make a "better" society. The debate about law and doctrines is really a debate
about ,belief and value systems. Although this debate is often
couched in elaborate constructs and premises, it is impossible to
divorce the question of what the law should be from the writers'
values and beliefs.
This Article concludes with an initial list of questions designed
to identify beliefs and values that should be examined in the debate about what bankruptcy should be. Until we closely examine
our beliefs and values about debtors, creditors, and the credit system, we cannot begin to resolve the debate about bankruptcy
jurisprudence.
16. See infra part IV.
17. I use the terms "beliefs," "values," and "faith" to mean as follows: a belief is a
reference to what a person thinks about a fact; a value is something that is thought to be a
"good"; and faith is a trust that is based upon a hope that if the beliefs are true and the
values are promoted, the world will be a better place.
In the bankruptcy debate, the facts could be historical facts or empirical facts. What
makes the statement a belief instead of a statement that could be true or false is the inability to have proven the fact to be true or false. Beliefs that are not based upon objectively
provable facts cannot be proven true or false. See Jeremy Waldron, On the Objectivity of
Morals: Thought on Gilbert's "Democratic Individuality", 80 CAL. L. REV. 1361, 1398-1403
(1992). For example, the statement "I believe that God exists" cannot be attacked as factually false or supported as factually true. That I believe in the existence of God is true in the
sense that I really believe it. But the fact that God exists cannot currently, nor perhaps
ever, be proven true to the satisfaction of someone who believes that God does not exist.
The fact in the belief statement, "God exists," will be true to me and false to the atheist.
Neither of us will be successful in persuading the other of the truth or falsity of that "fact."
The "facts" inherent in the beliefs of the writers in the bankruptcy debate are just like the
"God exists" fact in the example above. Neither side is persuaded of the falsity of their own
"facts" nor the truth of the opposing side's "facts."
In the bankruptcy debate, something is a value if it is thought to be a desirable outcome or activity. Each set of theorists has a set of values regarding what would be a good
outcome or activity that should be promoted. See infra part II.
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During the last ten years, two primary theories of bankruptcy
reorganization have emerged-the creditors' bargain theory and
the loss allocation theory.' The creditors' bargain theory is based
upon an economic principle maximizing the collective wealth of
creditors. The loss allocation theory is based upon distributing
losses among the affected parties. Each theory is built upon different beliefs and values regarding the nature of people, the nature of
community, the optimal method of distributing resources, and the
optimal allocation of decision making power. The reasoning of each
theory and the theorists' apparent' 9 underlying beliefs and values
will be explained below.
A.

Creditors' Bargain

The creditors' bargain theory of bankruptcy reorganization is
derived from the law and economics school of thought. 0 This theory has as its starting assumption that a business has at least two
different values, a liquidation value and a going concern value."
18. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenburg, The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 948
(1991); Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: What Should the Rule Be?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (1992).
19. In most instances, I am inferring what the beliefs and values appear to be based
upon the justifications and reasoning the theorist uses to explain the theory. The theorists
rarely admit that their own values and beliefs are an inextricable part of the respective
theories.
20. The economic approach to law posits a world in which resources are limited in
relation to human wants. This approach assumes that humans are rational maximizers of
their self-interest and that, as such, they will respond to incentives by making choices which
will increase their satisfaction. Thus, human behavior can be altered by changing surroundings in such a manner that a modification of behavior would increase satisfaction. From this
proposition, the economic approach to law derives three fundamental concepts. First, there
is an inverse relation between price charged and quantity demanded. Second, the cost of
doing an activity is measured by the value resources would command at their next best
use-the foregone opportunity. Third, resources tend to gravitate toward their highest valued use if exchange is permitted. When resources are being used where their value is greatest, they are described as being deployed in an efficient manner. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 1.1, at 3-10 (3d ed. 1986).
For an explanation and illustration of the application of the creditors' bargain, see
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 4; Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1; Jackson & Scott, supra note 1.
21. Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 158-60; Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, supra note 1, at 864-65. Some debate exists regarding methods and times at
which the value of property should be determined. See, e.g., David G. Carlson, Secured
Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 Am.U. L. REV. 63 (1991)
[hereinafter Carlson, Eely Character]; David G. Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under
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The liquidation value is based upon the sale of the business' assets
on a piecemeal basis.22 The going concern value reflects the worth
of the operating business, typically using a capitalized earnings estimate.2 3 If the going concern value is greater than the liquidation
value, the greater value should be preserved for the creditors.2"
When confronted with a financially distressed business, individual creditors, acting on their own behalf, have an incentive to
pursue their state collection remedies to procure as big a part of
the debtor's value as possible.2 5 Collection remedies in most states
are designed for liquidation, that is, seizing and selling assets. 26 If a
creditor is afraid that the debtor will not have enough value to pay
that creditor's claim, the creditor has an incentive to use procedures designed to liquidate assets to collect its debt. 27 Once some
of the debtor's business assets are seized, several consequences folBankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of
Collateral, 6 BANKE. DEV. J. 253 (1989); Patrick Fitzgerald, Comments, Bankruptcy Code
Section 506(a) and Undersecured Creditors: What Date for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1953 (1987); James F. Queenan, Jr., Standards for Valuation of Security Interest in Chapter 11, 92 CoM. L.J. 18 (1987); Kaaran E. Thomas, Valuation of Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings: Emerging Issues, 51 MONT. L. REV. 126 (1990). See generally 1 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 3-39 (1937) (reprinted 1965) (discussing various
valuation methods). This debate leads to uncertainty in the values that can properly be
assigned to the liquidation value and going concern value of a business for purposes of the
application of the creditors' bargain paradigm.
22. 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 44-46, 2 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 759-68 (1937) (reprinted 1965); see also Carlson, Eely Character,supra note 21,
at 75.
23. The basic principle of capitalized earnings valuations is that the value of an enterprise is dependent entirely on that enterprise's prospective earnings. Such an enterprise
valuation is designed to reflect the acquisition value to those persons who are in a position
to exploit the business for their own profit. Under this method, present value is calculated
by applying a multiple to the enterprise's projected profit. See 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 21,
at 233-38; see also Queenan, supra note 21, at 38-43 (explaining capitalization multiples and
their application). Scholars who advocate for the creditors' bargain theory identify capitalized earnings valuations as a basis for measuring the present value of going concerns. See
Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 136-38.
24. Whether the going concern value is generally greater than the liquidation value of
enterprises is a matter of some dispute. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 6, at 747. See
generally Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 133-34, 136-38; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 1, at 1046-47 (if any going concern value exists, it is not given to the creditors);
Roe, supra note 4, at 534-58..
25. See Alder, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 1, at 444-45; LoPucki & Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 6, at 127.
26. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 550.01-.42 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 626.1-.108 (West
1950); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-350a to -400e (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.011-.29 (West
1993). See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Money Judgments in Early
American History, 71 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1973) (describing historical basis for state collection remedies).
27. Alder, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 1, at 444-45; Jackson, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 860-65.
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low. Other creditors start to get nervous that the debtor will be
unable to pay debts owed to them and move to collect their debts
using state liquidation type remedies.28 The more assets the debtor
loses in this liquidation process, the less likely the debtor can keep
operating the business.2 9 Thus, this state law liquidation process
will prevent a debtor from operating the business to generate the
greater going concern value. 0
To have any hope of preserving the greater going concern
value, all of the creditors would have to agree that no one should
try to liquidate the debtor's assets to pay their respective claims."1
The difficulty with getting all the creditors to make this agreement
is the cost of bargaining, or in economic terms, high transaction
costs.32 On their own, without some process for doing so, the creditors will not be able to agree to act in concert to preserve the
debtor's greater going concern value because high transaction costs
are a barrier to that agreement. 3 Bankruptcy reorganization provides the process that stays creditors' individualized efforts to liquidate the debtor and provides the opportunity to generate the
greater going concern value.3 4 The tradeoff for staying the creditor's ability to liquidate the debtor's assets immediately is twofold:
the greater going concern value is distributed to the creditors and
the creditors are entitled to control how that greater going concern
value is generated. 5
Based upon the above rationale, reorganization is "justified"
as a method for preserving the debtor's greater going concern value
if several conditions are met. First, the debtor must have a going
concern value that is greater than the liquidation value. Second,
28. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 862 (discussing the incentives for a creditors' race and the associated strategic costs).
29. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 862 (noting
that a creditors' race to use individualistic remedies is likely to lead to a premature termina-

tion of the debtor's business).
30.

Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 862; see

Bowers, Groping and Coping, supra note 1, at 2105-06 (describing the process as a creditors'
feeding frenzy).
31.
32.

Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 863-64.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 865. But

see Adams, supra note 1 (arguing that none of the proposed economic alternatives to bankruptcy show that the costs of buying and selling businesses outside of bankruptcy are less
than the costs inside bankruptcy).
33.
34.

Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 864-65.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 864, 866-

67.
35. See, e.g., JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 4, at 10-19, 209-29; Baird, Uneasy
Case, supra note 1, at 138-45; Jackson, Of Liquidation, supra note 1, at 404-11; Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 868-72; Jackson & Scott,
supra note 1, at 158-62.
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the creditors must receive that greater going concern value. Third,
the creditors must be the recognized beneficiaries of the process
3a
and in control of the process.
Based upon that brief explanation of the creditors' bargain
theory, one can identify several beliefs and values. The first belief
is that the greater going concern value in fact exists. If the greater
value does not exist, then the justification for reorganization in37
stead of liquidation of the business fails.
The second belief is that people, primarily creditors, make rational decisions. One of. the most basic premises of capitalistic economic models is that people make decisions using a cost-benefit
analysis.3 8 In the creditors' bargain theory, the creditor is presumed to desire to engage in a pecuniary cost-benefit analysis regarding collection of its debt from the debtor. The creditor is rational if the creditor tries to maximize its own pecuniary wealth. If
the benefits of collection are higher than the costs of collection, the
creditor will rationally try to collect the debt. 9
Coupled with this belief in creditor rationality is the value
that maximizing the creditors' collective pecuniary wealth is a good
36. Based on these conditions, the creditors' bargain theorists attack the current reorganization scheme as unworkable and a candidate for repeal or significant change. The major criticisms of the current reorganization scheme are:
(i) the going concern value is illusory, see supra note 24;
(ii) the going concern value, if existing, is siphoned off by other non-creditor entities,
such as management, lawyers, and other professionals during the course of the reorganization, see Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 135; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at
1047;
(iii) the going concern value is distributed to claimants junior to the senior creditors,
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1052-53; but see Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (critiquing
Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical analysis); and
(iv) current bankruptcy law leaves too much control in the hands of management to
take unwise risks with the assets or to use the threat of bankruptcy to gain leverage against
the creditors and the stockholders, Bradley and Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1047; Baird,
Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 131-32.
37. In fact, as noted previously, according to creditors' bargain theorists, the failure of
the current reorganization scheme to identify or preserve the greater going concern value to
the exclusive benefit of senior creditors is a primary defect of the current reorganization
scheme. See supra note 36.
38. POSNER, supra note 20, § 1.1 at 3-4. For an interesting criticism of this belief, see
Mark Cooney, Why is Economic Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 2211, 2230 (1993) (book review) ("It is striking that emperical scholars, particularly
those whose work brings them into close and sustained contact with their subjects . . . do
not adopt a rational actor-model of human behavior.").
39. Some have questioned whether this belief about presumed creditor behavior is in
fact true as a matter of observable human behavior. See, e.g., Carlson, Theory, supra note 1,
at 463; Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 737-38 nn. 91-94; Rusch, supra
note 18, at 1327-28.
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that should be promoted.40 Each creditor is presumed to not object
to a procedure that will allow other creditors to collect their debts
as long as its own debt also is collected. Thus if the law fosters
creditors' collective wealth maximization, the creditors are presumed not to object. This combination of a belief about creditor
rationality and a value of collective creditor wealth maximization
paints a creditor as existing for one purpose-maximizing creditor
collective pecuniary wealth.41
In spite of the above described belief and value, which seem to
depend upon a type of cooperative human behavior, the creditors'
bargain theory has an underlying belief that people will not cooperate without coercion of some sort. This belief about community
behavior is reflected in the idea that creditors must be stayed by
law from pursuing their own individual attempts to collect debts. 2
Without the benefit of the law forcing creditors to stop collection
efforts, each creditor would be unwilling to put aside its own interests for the interests of the community. This belief presents the
community as a group of people forced to work together based
upon an external determination of the common good defined
above-creditor collective wealth maximization.
A value promoted in the creditors' bargain theory is that the
contractual bargaining model embodied in state law debtor and
creditor relations is the optimal way to distribute resources in the
market. This value is reflected in the creditors' bargain theory by
the idea that distributions of property and money in bankruptcy
should be based upon state law created property and contract
rights. 3 Without this underlying value, the creditors would have
no greater right to the going concern value than would the equity
owners. 44 As in many economic models, contracts and bargaining in
the market is held to be the ideal resource distribution system. 5
An additional value promoted in the creditors' bargain theory
40. See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 160.
41. Reducing all considerations to one value is attractive in the sense that it appears
to make solutions to problems easier. Such reductionism, however, does not really make the
choices easier; it merely masks the relevant considerations. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 77-84 (1991).
42. Jackson, Of Liquidation, supra note 1, at 402-03.
43. Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 160.
44. For criticism of the creditors' bargain reliance on state law rights, see Carlson,
Theory, supra note 1, at 460-62; Rusch, supra note 18, at 1331 n.82.
45. In the creditors' bargain view, only those with contractual rights are considered
part of the creditors' bargain. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations,supra note 4, at
103-05. See generally Posner, supra note 20, § 1.2 at 14 (efficiency tested by what would
happen in a hypothetical market). For criticism of the exclusion of non-creditors and the
debtor from the bargaining, see Carlson, Theory, supra note 1, at 471-78.
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is that the creditors should have the power to control the debtors'
future.'6 This value of creditor control is based on three things: the
belief that creditors are rational, the value of creditor collective
wealth maximization, and the value of contractual bargaining. Because contracts based upon bargaining should be respected, the
creditors and the debtor through their pre-bankruptcy contracts
have decided how to divide the debtor's assets. The creditors will
rationally decide how to put the assets to the best use to maximize
collective creditor recovery. The creditors are viewed as the owners
of the debtor's assets when the debtor fails to pay and the creditors should control how those assets are used. This leads to the
conclusion that the creditors should have the power to decide if
and how to create any going concern value.
The beliefs and values that support the creditors' bargain theory paint a picture of a person as an individual whose only concern
is maximizing individual pecuniary wealth. This person does not
willingly agree to be a part of a community but must be coerced to
subordinate individual immediate gratification for a longer term
community interest. The community is not held together by a common bond of well being but rather by the dictates of an external
force, i.e. law. The optimal way to distribute resources in the community is bargaining in the market between members of the community. Parties will bargain based upon the principle of maximizing their individual pecuniary wealth. This bargaining process
within a debtor's bankruptcy case is presumed to enhance collective wealth. Other considerations in the redistribution of resources
should be ignored. Finally, the persons in charge of making decisions regarding communal rules and resources are those with the
recognized contractual claims to the assets. Those persons who
have no recognized contractual claims to the assets should have no
input into community decisions regarding those assets.
B. Loss Allocation
The commentators who favor a loss allocation perspective' of
bankruptcy naturally draw a different portrait of the nature of a
46. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 6.
47. Several authors write from this perspective, although not necessarily in concert
with each other. See Ayer, supra note 1, at 435-43. The main proponents of this perspective
are Donald R. Korobkin, Elizabeth Warren, Raymond T. Nimmer, and David Gray Carlson.
See, e.g., Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5; Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra
note 1; Nimmer, supra note 10, at 1013-34; Carlson, supra note 2. Professor Korobkin has
proposed an alternative to the economic model to justify bankruptcy law. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5; Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1; Korobkin,
Value and Rationality, supra note 1. Part II.B of this Article is based on Korobkin's work.
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person, the nature of the community, the optimal resource distribution method, and the proper allocation of decision making
power. Given the different beliefs and values that underlie the loss
allocation perspective, it is no surprise that this theory looks different from the creditors' bargain theory.
The loss allocation theorists describe bankruptcy as a process
used to allocate resources among all parties affected by a debtor's
financial distress.48 Bankruptcy is designed to respond to the problem of financial distress, not the problem of creditor collection.49
Bankruptcy reorganization provides a process for the parties to engage in discussion about what the future of the debtor will be, i.e.
how the debtor's future value will be generated and divided among
the affected parties.5 0 The circumstance of financial distress provides the catalyst for a reexamination of the debtor's future.51
The bankruptcy process is designed to respond in a flexible
manner to the crisis of financial distress and to competing concerns
and values of the affected parties.52 These concerns and values
cannot be compared on some absolute hierarchical scale that will
lead to a decision about a dominant value. 53 Through coordination
of behavior, bankruptcy should attempt to accommodate as many
of these concerns and values as possible. 4 In deciding how to accommodate as many of the competing interests as possible, once
the limits of coordination are reached, some consideration should
be given to those parties who occupy the most vulnerable position,
that is, those parties with the most to lose if their values are
frustrated. 5
In the loss allocation school, the focus of bankruptcy is on the
"fairness" of the process, not the ultimate distributional result
achieved. The bankruptcy process is a justified response to financial distress if it is inclusive of all affected parties, is flexible, seeks
to achieve as many divergent aims as possible, and gives consideration to the parties in the most vulnerable position. 6 The bank48. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 762; Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1, at 781, 783-84.
49. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 766-68.
50. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 768-87.
51. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 763-66.
52. See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 351-65.
53. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 765 & n.222; Korobkin, Value
and Rationality, supra note 1, at 341-42. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of
Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520 (1992) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990)) (discussing incommensurable values).
54. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 581-84.
55. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 584-89.
56. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 572-89.
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ruptcy judges who adjudicate the disputes of the parties guide this
process in particular cases using these principles within the framework of the applicable legislation. 57 In making those decisions, the
judges should not be controlled by an end result rule, but by the
rationality of the process of decision making along the guidelines
58
outlined above within the statutory framework.
The loss allocation theorists base this process orientated
school on beliefs and values both similar and different from the
creditors' bargain beliefs and values. The first belief is the same as
the creditors' bargain belief that a greater going concern value exists and can be preserved if the business is reorganized rather than
liquidated. This greater going concern value consists of more than
the capitalized earnings and the balance sheet of the business. 9 In
the loss allocation theory, this belief provides the basis for the
ongoing discussion concerning the future of the business.
The second belief is that individuals make rational decisions
using a type of cost-benefit analysis but also take into account
many values and aims other than individual wealth maximization." Because an individual will not know all the costs or benefits
of a particular course of action, a cost-benefit analysis which affords certainty to the decisionmaker cannot take place. In addition, an individual will often have to make choices between incommensurable aims." Both the belief that individuals consider more
than monetary wealth and the belief that cost-benefit analysis is
uncertain are necessary to the loss allocation theory, as these beliefs create the common ground necessary to have productive discussions about the debtor's future. If solely pecuniary interest controlled an individual's decision making, outcomes were certain, or
values commensurable, common ground for discussion about the
debtor's future would not exist.
The loss allocation theorists' belief about the nature of the
community is also different from the creditors' bargain theorists'
belief. In the loss allocation theory, the belief is that the community affected by the debtor's financial distress will recognize that
everyone is in the process together. The community, once it recog57. See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 351-65; Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 595-627.
58. See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 351-65.
59. See Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 768-72 (proposing that the
enterprise's value consists of more than its balance sheet).
60. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 772-74; see Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 579-89; Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at
342-43.
61. See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 344-51.
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nizes that common interest, will work to come to an agreed result
regarding the debtor's future. The primary role of the automatic
stay is not to force the community to forgo its individual interests;
rather, the automatic stay provides the space necessary to allow
the community to recognize its shared stake in the debtor and engage in a dialectic process regarding the debtor's future.2
Both the loss allocation and creditors' bargain theorists value
the contractual bargaining model as a method of resource distribution. In the loss allocation theory, however, each party's claim to
the assets is not determined solely by contractual entitlements, but
also by legislative and judicial distributional judgments6 3 designed
to protect traditionally disenfranchised parties6 4 or to prefer certain types of claimants based upon non-bankruptcy reasons.6 5 Although the loss allocation theorists also support bargaining as a
way to distribute resources outside of the bankruptcy process, the
loss allocation theorists broaden the distribution of leverage necessary to the bankruptcy bargaining process to both contractual and
non-contractual claimants.6 6 This focus on inclusiveness of all
claimants is necessary to make the process of distributing losses
among all affected parties work.
Finally, the loss allocation theorists value the impartiality and
wisdom of the bankruptcy judge as the proper repository of power
to decide an issue in the event the parties do not agree and Congress has not given a clear answer.6 7 Given that the focus of the
loss allocation school is on the process of decision making rather
than on the final result, the judges decide the particular issues
before them based upon the fairness of the process in light of legislative judgments in the statute.6 8 While some consideration is
given to the ideal of deciding like cases alike, in the throes of financial distress, like cases are unlikely. Thus, the benchmark for a
just decision in a particular case is to come to the fairest result
possible at this time in this case consistent with the legislative
rules using the concepts of inclusiveness, flexibility, achieving as
62. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 1, at 777-80; Korobkin, Contractarianism, supra note 5, at 598-601. But see Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 1, at 72-76

(criticizing Korobkin's account as "talk therapy" for debtors); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 90-92

(1992) (criticizing Korobkin's account as unrealistic).
63.
64.
65.

See Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 581-89, 607-08.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988) (priority distributions for wage claimants).
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) (priority distribution for unsecured tax

claims).
66.
67.
68.

Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 572-75.
See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 351-65.
See Korobkin, Value and Rationality, supra note 1, at 351-65.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1994

17

Montana Law LAW
Review,REVIEW
Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 2 [Vol. 55
MONTANA

many aims as possible, and protecting the most vulnerable. 9 This
allocation of judicial power is necessary because otherwise the process of allocation of losses would stagnate indefinitely if recalcitrant parties who refused to cooperate could stymie the process.
Just as in the creditors' bargain theory, the values and beliefs
inherent in the loss allocation theory outlined above reflect a set of
values and beliefs about the nature of a person, the nature of the
community, the optimal method for distributing resources, and the
optimal allocation of decision making power. In the loss allocation
world, an individual is a person who makes decisions using a type
of cost-benefit analysis laced with value choices and uncertain outcomes. That individual recognizes that he or she is part of a community of persons affected by another's financial distress and that
all members of the community will bear some loss because of that
distress. The community is governed both by legislative judgments
and by bargaining in deciding how the losses should be allocated
among the parties. Legislative distributional judgments are guided
by the ideas of protection of disenfranchised parties or other nonbankruptcy considerations. Given the possibility of widely divergent opinions regarding optimal resource distribution when the
statute does not provide a clear answer, the decision making power
regarding such distribution in a particular case should reside in the
bankruptcy judge. The judge should attempt to come to the fairest
result possible in a particular case, seeking to achieve as many of
the divergent aims as possible.
C.

Conclusion

In comparing the beliefs of the creditors' bargain theorists
with the beliefs and values of the loss allocation theorists, one can
see both similarities and differences in those beliefs and values regarding the nature of a person and the optimal method of resource
distribution. Both sets of theorists believe in the rationality of the
individual in making decisions. However, the beliefs diverge in defining rationality. The creditors' bargain theorists define rationality by one value only, pecuniary wealth maximization. In contrast,
the loss allocation theorists define rationality as allowing the individual to consider other values in addition to pecuniary interests.
Both sets of theorists believe in bargaining as the optimal method
of resource distribution. The creditors' bargain theorists advocate
for a "pure" market unfettered by legislative distributional judgments. The loss allocation theorists recognize the legitimacy of
69.

See Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 572-89.
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such legislative judgments to protect some types of claimants from

the full force of the debtor's losses.
Very little common ground in beliefs can be found regarding
the nature of the community and the optimal allocation of decision
making power. The creditors' bargain theorists portray the community as a group that must be forced against its will to participate in the debtor's rehabilitation. The loss allocation theorists
paint the community as a group that relies on the prospect of cooperative behavior to rehabilitate the debtor, once the members of
that community consider a perspective other than their own. The
creditors' bargain theorists almost deify the creditors in their wisdom to make "correct" decisions about the debtor's future. The
loss allocation theorists do the same to the bankruptcy judge,
trusting that entity with the decision making power when the statute does not provide a clear answer.
III.

ATTEMPTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE THEORISTS' BELIEFS AND
VALUES

Each proponent of the various theories attempts to justify his
or her own beliefs and values regarding the "proper" bankruptcy
paradigm using three primary methods: (1) an appeal to a historical foundation, (2) an appeal to empirical proof, and (3) an appeal
to the normative aspirations for society. This process of justification is generally done on two parallel tracks: first, that these bases
support the proposed theory; and, second, that these bases demonstrate the absurdity of the other theory. None of the three justification methods, however, convince the opposing theorist that his
or her own beliefs are false or that his or her own values are unworthy. Repeatedly reiterating these justification methods does not
go very far towards justifying either side's beliefs and values.
A.

Appeal to the Historical Foundation

Both the creditors' bargain theorists and the loss allocation
theorists appeal to the history of debtor-creditor legislation as support for the values and beliefs embodied in those theories.7 0 The
laws governing debtor-creditor relationships have embodied various concepts over time. In the history of bankruptcy and debtorcreditor relations, the law has reflected the concepts of punishing
70. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 860 &
n.18; JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 4, at 7-11; Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values,
supra note 1, at 744-55.
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the debtor for not paying,"' coercing the debtor to pay, 72 and forgiving the debtor for not paying. 73 These laws have been in response to economic cycles 74 and reflect perceptions of various beliefs and values, such as the desirability of credit and the merchant
class,"5 the relative fault of the debtor for being unable to pay,76
the creditor's right to be paid, 77 and the morality of not paying all
78
of one's just debts.
The creditors' bargain theorists seem to rely on the historically based values of the immorality of not paying one's just debts
and the creditors' right to be paid. These historically based values
directly support the creditors' bargain theorists' values of holding
state sanctioned contract and property rights as sacrosanct 7 9 and
of placing the decision making power in the hands of the "true"
owners of the insolvent debtor, i.e. the creditors.80 The creditors'
bargain theorists advocate that state law that created the reciprocal duty to pay and the right to be paid should be respected and
enforced in bankruptcy because one should pay one's debts and
creditors have a right to be paid.
The loss allocation theorists seem to rely on the historically
based values and beliefs that debtors are not necessarily immoral if
unable to pay all of their debts, the debtor is not always at fault
for its inability to pay debts, and the creditor is not always entitled
to be paid. These historically based values and beliefs are some71. Frimet, supra note 7, at 161-63; Levinthal, Early History, supra note 7, at 228-31;
PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 12 & n.3 (1974); CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 5

(1935);

EDWARD T. BALDWIN, A CONCISE TREATISE

UPON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1-2 (3d ed. 1883).
72. COLEMAN, supra note 71, at 3-5 (stating debtor's prison was a coercive tool to attempt to force debtors to pay their creditors); Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment and
Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 155
(1982) (discussing debtor's prison as a coercive tool).
73. See Tabb, supra note 8; WARREN, supra note 71, at 49-92 (describing the historical
period of 1827-61 where agitation for debtor relief occurred); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy
Policy: Toward a Moral Justificationfor FinancialRehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 527-31, 543-54 (1991).
74. See WARREN, supra note 71, at 9; Frimet, supra note 7. For a good description of
the economic cycles in United States history, see PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROSS,
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 83-86, 108-09, 124, 127, 181-82, 218-21, 252-53,
330, 334-36 (2d ed. 1963).
75. See Tabb, supra note 8, at 335-36; Weisberg, supra note 7, at 22-34.
76. See COLEMAN, supra note 71, at 16-30. See generally Weisberg, supra note 7, at
34-39; Tabb, supra note 8, at 338.
77. Weisberg, supra note 7, at 40-43; Radin, supra note 7, at 3 (bankruptcy is a creditors' remedy); Levinthal, Early History, supra note 7, at 225 (bankruptcy seeks primarily to
protect creditors).
78. Shuchman, supra note 11, at 428-39; Frimet, supra note 7, at 165.
79. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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times summed up in the phrase "a fresh start for the 'honest but
unfortunate debtor'." 81 The loss allocation theorists use these values and beliefs to support their ideas that contractual entitlements
based upon the duty to pay and right to be paid are not the only
82
determinates of how to distribute resources in a bankruptcy.
Both the community of persons affected by the debtor's financial
distress and the bankruptcy judge are involved in deciding when it
is "just" for the debtor not to pay its contractual and non-contractual obligations, 3 that is, is this that honest but unfortunate
debtor who deserves a fresh start?
Both the creditors' bargain and the loss allocation theories
have support in the history of debtor and creditor relationships.
While history may give context to the development of both sets of
values and beliefs, it is difficult to see how either theory can be
wholeheartedly accepted or rejected based solely on history. Historically held values and beliefs are evidence that people at one
time perceived a particular result or activity as a good thing or
thought that a particular fact was true. Merely because those values and beliefs did exist does not mean that the values are in fact
desirable or that the beliefs are in fact true. Precisely because the
historical values and beliefs can be easily discounted as presently
not desirable or untrue, each set of theorists can easily discount
the opposing theorists' reliance on history as justification for their
respective theories.
B.

Appeal to Empirical Proof

Both theories have a set of beliefs about the "true" nature of a
person and the "true" nature of a community.8 ' Each belief appears to be the type of fact that could be tested empirically. Writers in each camp seem to draw on personal experience and instinct
to support their view of the empirical truth of these beliefs. Unfortunately, very little scientifically based empirical work is done in
the area of how debtors and creditors interact and make decisions
in the context of a debtor's financial distress.8 5
The empirical work that has been done points to a state of
81.
"honest
(1934).
82.
83.
84.
85.
Data in
1987).

See Weisberg, supra note 7, at 7-10; Tabb, supra note 8, at 338, 370. This phrase
but unfortunate debtor" is derived from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62, 67-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-39, 42, 60-62 and accompanying text.
Ayer, supra note 1, at 443-47; Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical
FormulatingBankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 198-209 (Spring
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affairs unlike either theorists' set of beliefs about the nature of a
person and the nature of the community. For example, Professors
LoPucki and Whitford have presented some evidence that persons
affected by a debtor's financial distress do not look to notions of
the collective good of the enterprise nor to their own individual
pecuniary interest in deciding how the assets of the debtor are distributed or the reorganization of the debtor is achieved.86 Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook paint a picture of consumer
debtor behavior based upon the debtor's individual moral convictions, and the local legal culture in deciding whether to file a
Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13 petition,87 not on whether the debtor is
advocating its own pecuniary or other interests. Professor
Shuchman's work supports the idea of the unfortunate but deserving consumer debtors who need relief from their debts.88
The empirical research that has been done to date has not extensively analyzed the affected parties' motivations or decision
making process in the context of the debtor's financial distress.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford have studied extensively a group
of large publicly held companies,89 but that research might be very
difficult to use to draw generalizations to the behavior of other
types of debtors and creditors.90 Given the lack of empirical research on the motivations of both debtors and creditors in all types
of bankruptcy cases, both sides of the bankruptcy debate are unjustified in relying on empirical data to support their respective
86. See LoPucki & Whitford, BargainingOver Equity's Share, supra note 6, at 154-58
(noting study of 43 large publicly held companies on the issue of distribution to "underwater" equity holder concludes that ability to get distribution depends upon equity's bargaining leverage and the negotiating skill of the persons representing equity); Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizationof Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance] (stating management incentives in reorganization are not consistently for the benefit of any one of the three major groups: management, creditors, or
shareholders).
87. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 243-44, 246-52, 337
(1989).
88. Philip Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1982-83: An Empirical Study, 15 SETON
HALL L. REV. 541 (1985) (examining income/assets/liabilities of individual debtors, concluding that majority were just barely above poverty level); Philip Shuchman, The Average
Bankrupt: A Descriptionand Analysis of 753 PersonalBankruptcy Filings in Nine States,
88 COM. L.J. 288 (1983) (examining income/assets/liabilities of individual debtors, concluding that majority were just barely above poverty level); see also Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
Lawrence A. Weiss, The IncreasingBankruptcy Filing Rate: An HistoricalAnalysis, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1993) (increase in filings after adoption of 1978 Code more likely caused by
the decreasing ability of society as a whole to pay debts than to change in the law).
89. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 6; LoPucki
& Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 86; LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns,supra
note 10.
90. See LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 1, at 756-59.
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belief systems about the "true" nature of a person or community.
C. Appeal to Normative Aspirations for Society
Given the inability of either set of theorists to support convincingly their theories with historical or empirical evidence, the
theorists engage in a battle over the correct normative paradigm
for debtor and creditor relationships in the context of the debtor's
financial distress. The creditors' bargain theorists argue against the
current bankruptcy scheme as violating their normative paradigm. 1 The loss allocation theorists support the current bankruptcy scheme as following their normative paradigm.92 Both in
the courts and in Congress, the battle between the underlying values and beliefs of the two schools is captured in the inquiry, "what
are the purposes of bankruptcy?" 9 The creditors' bargain theorists
want that answer to be enhanced collective creditor recovery. The
loss allocation theorists want that answer to be a fair process of
loss allocation among all affected parties. 4
This debate over the "correct" normative paradigm is the debate over how society should deal with financial distress in a credit
based economy9" and cannot be divorced from value judgments regarding the obligation to pay debts.9 6 Although the creditors' bargain theorists do not admit that their theory requires any value
choices, the theory nevertheless demands that a value choice be
made that relief from debt obligations should exist only on terms
acceptable to the debtor's creditors. The loss allocation theorists
attempt to soften the essential value choice about the scope of the
appropriate debtor relief by diffusing the decision making authority among the affected parties, the courts, and Congress. Even
though both theories attempt to sidestep the value choice, both are
in fact making different value choices regarding the debtor's obligation to pay debts. Each set of theorists think that the value
choices they propose are the desirable choices for society and lobby
the legal community to accept their divergent views of the correct
aspirational normative paradigm.
At this normative paradigm level, the value choices are very
91. See supra note 1.
92. See supra note 1.
93. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 18, at 695.
94. See supra notes 20-69 and accompanying text. One can see in these divergent answers the dichotomy between rules and standards that Duncan Kennedy drew almost 20
years ago. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976).
95. See Weisberg, supra note 7, at 5.
96. Shuchman, supra note 11, at 414-18; see Smith, supra note 41, at 73-75.
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stark. Both sides clearly cherish different things as important and
desirable. The debate rages on. The creditors' bargain theorists do
not convince the loss allocation theorists. The loss allocation theorists do not convince the creditors' bargain theorists. In the absence of convincing justification for either theory as the "correct"
aspirational normative paradigm, the debate at this level cannot be
resolved.
IV. BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE AS PART OF THE OVERALL
JURISPRUDENTIAL PICTURE

The bankruptcy jurisprudence debate is just one segment of a
larger jurisprudential debate regarding law that has taken place
over the centuries in the writings of various jurisprudential writers.
In reviewing the historical jurisprudential debate, the same questions seem to be addressed repeatedly: (1) is law a legitimate exercise of power; (2) is the law enforcing the "correct" normative values; (3) are the legal decision makers following the law or are they
making decisions using their own values and beliefs; and (4) is the
law just? The theorists in the bankruptcy area are addressing
those same questions using the language of debtor and creditor relations rather than the language of philosophy. The values and beliefs of the writer influence the resolution of these jurisprudential
questions. Even though an understanding of the jurisprudential
thinking can expand an understanding of the bankruptcy debate,
jurisprudential thinking will not help the bankruptcy debaters escape from the necessary confrontation of their respective beliefs
and values.
A.

Legitimacy of Law

To legitimatize law as authority that should be respected, the
jurisprudential writing addresses whether law is different than the
naked assertion of power by those who are in power in a particular
society. 7 Thus, the jurisprudential writings on this issue ask the
question, "what is law," or "what counts as law?" In attempting to
answer those questions and, thus, legitimatize law as a source of
authority in a society, legal philosophers have espoused several different approaches.
97. See C. MURPHY, JR., MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 41-42, 48-61 (1978); Steve J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 758-76 (1989). See generally Francis J.
Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993)
(discussing the concept of the rule of law which posits that those in power follow the law
rather than make the law).
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One approach to that issue is natural law theory. The essence
of natural law theory is that law is grounded in morality. e8 Morality is, in turn, grounded upon the needs and nature of human beings, 9 where a prime motivating need of humans is the need for
social cooperation. 10 0 If the law can be traced to the need for
human social cooperation or to other moral norms based upon the
nature of the human being, then the law is legitimate and not a
naked assertion of power. 10 1 Conversely, those laws that contravene
those moral norms are not legitimate laws and should not be
"counted" as law. 10 2
The positivist approach to this issue originally was that law is
the legitimate command of the state.10 3 Legal positivists attempted
to divorce law from moral norms. 04 Law was law even though not
necessarily based upon any moral principles.0 5 Law was not a
mere naked assertion of power if law was enacted and enforced according to a fair process. 0 6
In reaction to the natural law and positivist approaches, 10 7 the
98. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORAL
AND JUSTICE 8 (1986); JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY 8
(1990); Daniel C.K. Chow, A PragmaticModel of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV. 755, 761-62 (1992);
John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1990); Steven
R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 108 (1992).
For an interesting perspective on the historical relationship between concepts of moral-

ity and law and the role of religious beliefs, see

HAROLD

J. BERMAN,

LAW AND REVOLUTION:

THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 165-98, 292-94, 520-38 (1983). See also
Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 871 (1993) (discussing the
differences between Jewish law, where the coercion of the law is justified by faith or belief in
God, and contemporary legal theory, which has no ultimate coercive belief system).
99. HERGET, supra note 98, at 9-10; Robert P. George, Recent Criticisms of Natural
Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373-75 (1988).
100. HERGET, supra note 98, at 9-10.
101. ARKEs, supra note 98, at 27; HERGET, supra note 98, at 10-11.
102. ARKEs, supra note 98, at 169-172; Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 780 (1988).
103. Berman, supra note 102, at 780; Daniel C.K. Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 221, 231-32 (1990) [hereinafter Chow, Trashing];Chow, supra note 98, at 762-63; Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 818 (1990); Salbu,
supra note 98, at 126; see Hergert, supra note 98, at 12-21. Professor Hovenkamp briefly
sketches the expansion of the positivist's approach to consider as law more than duly enacted or court stated rules. Hovenkamp, supra, at 819.
104. Berman, supra note 102, at 780; Hovenkamp, supra note 103, at 818; Steven R.
Salbu, Differentiated Perspectives on Insider Trading: The Effect of Paradigm Selection
on Policy, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 373, 376-77 (1992).
105. Morawetz, supra note 12, at 412-14.
106. Salbu, supra note 104, at 377-78; see Chow, supra note 98, at 763.
107. Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century
America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 452-53, (1986) (discussing realism as a reaction against positivist approach); Gary Minds, The Jurisprudential
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legal realists started with the premise that language, the primary
vehicle for law, is indeterminate.' 0 8 Therefore, the interpretation of
the law necessarily depends upon the values and perspective of the
interpreter.' 0 The enactment and enforcement of law is influenced
by the political and cultural milieu of both the enactor and enforcer.11 ° Legal realists thus started toward the view of law as the
assertion of power by those who happened to be in power or positions of authority.'
As can be seen from the above summary, jurisprudential writing has gone from one side of the spectrum to the other on whether
law is more than the naked assertion of power by those who happen to be in power. Theorists continue to debate this issue
today."'
One can see the same debate regarding the legitimacy of law in
the bankruptcy area. The creditors' bargain theorists challenged
the academic world to "justify" bankruptcy reorganization."' Such
justification is needed only if one takes a non-positivist approach
and looks beyond constitutionally prescribed authority to legitimize the law." 4 In the creditors' bargain view, the mere enactment
of positive law according to the constitutional parameters was inMovements of the 1980s, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 599, 633-34 (1989) (discussing realism as a reaction against formalism). See generally HERGET, supra note 98, at 147-70; Robert S. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General.Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 861, 868-69 (1981).
108. Minda, supra note 107, at 634 & n.195; Salbu, supra note 104, at 379; Joseph W.
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 468-69 (1988) (book review).
109. Salbu, supra note 104, at 379-80; Singer, supra note 108, at 470-71.
110. Chow, Trashing, supra note 103, at 250-57; Singer, supra note 108, at 474-75; see
Golding, supra note 107, at 448-63.
111. As has been noted by others, the critical legal studies movement can claim legal
realism as its not too distant ancestor. Minda, supra note 107, at 636-37. Critical legal scholars take legal realism to another level of skepticism about law. Critical legal scholars have
advanced the position that law is only politics and power. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 14-15 (1990); Chow, Trashing, supra note 103, at 233-34; Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1524-26 (1991).
112. See Mootz, supra note 97 (critiquing the Enlightenment version of the rule of law
and offering a post-Enlightenment interpretation of the same); Minda, supra note 107
(describing philosophical debate about the legitimacy of law and new critiques of law such
as law and economics, critical legal studies and feminist jurisprudence); Morawetz, supra
note 12 (describing and analyzing debate between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists
in judicial decision making); Chow, supra note 98 (describing a method of thinking about
law that is neither foundationalist nor anti-foundationalist but charts a "middle course"
based on the principle of coherence). But see Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72
B.U. L. REV. 273 (1992) (coherence with existing beliefs does not justify beliefs; law coherent
with those beliefs is also not justified because of the coherence).
113. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 858-59,
907.
114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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sufficient to support bankruptcy as a legitimate law. Although not
advocating disobedience to the enacted bankruptcy law, the creditors' bargain theorists looked for guiding principles outside the
bankruptcy legislation to legitimize the positive law. In contrast,
the loss allocation theorists take a more positivist approach and
support the duly enacted law that is enforced according to a fair
process and implements the norms the state has accepted. 115 The
fairness of the process justifies the law.' 1 6 The loss allocation theorists also acknowledge the role of political compromise in the enactment of the positive law." 7 This debate about justifying bankruptcy law is the same as the debate about justifying law in
general.
How one addresses this question of law's legitimacy is influenced by one's beliefs about the nature of a person and by one's
values regarding optimal power allocations. For example, given
that the creditors' bargain theorists believe that creditors are rational wealth maximizers who should hold the decision making
power about the debtor's future, it makes sense that the creditors'
bargain theorists think current bankruptcy law is not a legitimate
exercise of congressional power. Current bankruptcy law gives
enormous power to the debtor to decide its future. 1 8 Conversely,
the loss allocation theorists are more willing to accept the duly enacted positive law because that law accords with (i) the belief that
individuals make decisions by choosing among incommensurable
aims with uncertain outcomes and (ii) the allocation of decision
making power when parties disagree to an impartial third party,
the bankruptcy judge." 9 One's perspective of the legitimacy of a
particular law is apparently influenced by whether that law accords
with one's beliefs and values.
B. Law and the "Correct" Normative Paradigm
Jurisprudential thinkers have struggled with whether we can
be certain that the law is enforcing the "right" normative goals. In
this search for the correct normative paradigm, three dominant approaches have emerged; natural law, cultural relativism, and criti115. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; Korobkin, Contractarianism,
supra note 5, at 572-89 (summarizing the bankruptcy choice model based on JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) as an inclusive process model).
117. Korobkin, Contractarianisni,supra note 5, at 543; see Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1, at 785-93.
118. LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 1, at 732-39.
119. See Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 5, at 595-98.
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cal legal studies.
The natural law theorists have advanced two normative bases:
(1) the normative goal of social cooperation to promote the common good,12 0 and (2) the ability to derive moral truths about individual rights from the ideas that humans are rational beings and
the concept of morals itself.' 2 If the law can be traced to these
identified normative bases through logical reasoning, then we can
be certain that we have the "right" normative answer.' 2 2 In addition, most natural law theorists have advanced the idea that these
normative bases are the "right" answer for all people, in all times,
and in all cultures.' 2 3 These normative goals are the desirable normative goals regardless of the desires of the community itself.' 4
In direct contrast to the natural law concept of normative bases, the relativists respond with the idea that the people of the
particular community decide what normative goals should be ad25
vanced through law.'
The relativists depend upon the idea of
community consensus to determine whether the law advances the
"right" normative goal.' 2 6 If the community has a consensus that
the norm advanced in the law is "right," then we can be more certain that the norm is a valid "right" answer.
Unlike either of the two approaches above, the critical legal
scholars advance the skeptics' argument that the search for certainty of normative principles is itself an illusion. They argue that
we can never have any certainty that the normative goal advanced
is the "right" answer.' 2 7 The uncertainty is created by the indeter120. HERGET, supra note 98, at 9-10; Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the
Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1985).
121. ARKxs, supra note 98, at 72-92, 159-74; Finnis, supra note 98, at 11 (moral absolutes exist).
122. ARKES, supra note 98, at 168-69; Berman, supra note 102, at 780; George, supra
note 99, at 1387-89. But see Finnis, supra note 98, at 4-7 (reasoning from the "good" premises to the right answer in a particular case is not easy or clear).
123. ARKES, supra note 98, at 92, 162; Salbu, supra note 98, at 107-08.
124. Chow, supra note 98, at 761-62; Salbu, supra note 98, at 108 & n.27.
125. R. George Wright, The Consequences of Contemporary Legal Relativism, 22 U.
TOL. L. REV. 73, 75-77 & n.6 (1990); see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109
(1977); Berman, supra note 102, at 795-97 (historical perspective needed on development of
community values); Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15, 52-53 (1990) (law is derived from individual moral and political beliefs of a society).
126. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90
MICH. L. REV. 685, 694 (1992); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:Law as Practice &
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 987-94 (1990) (law itself is a dialogue of competing visions for
society); Salbu, supra note 98, at 109-10; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF
CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY AND CULTURE 197 (1990); MURPHY, supra note 97, at 131-34.
127. ALTMAN, supra note 111, at 13-15; Salbu, supra note 104, at 381; Salbu, supra
note 98, at 124; Tushnet, supra note 111, at 1524-26.
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minacy of language and the inability to demonstrate the clear
choice for one normative goal over another. 12 8 Thus, the certainty
that both the natural law theorists and the relativists have
searched for regarding the correct normative principles is
unattainable.
The parallel to the bankruptcy debate is striking. As stated
previously, when the historical and empirical justification methods
fail to convince the opposing theorist of the validity of the proposed beliefs and values, the only justification method left is the
appeal to the normative aspirations for society. 129 The creditors'
bargain theorists advance the correct normative paradigm as enhanced collective creditor pecuniary wealth maximization. 13 0 This
relevance on a set normative principle using an economic model of
human behavior is reminiscent of natural law reasoning. The loss
allocation theorists, on the other hand, advance as the correct normative paradigm the distribution of losses among affected parties,
as decided by Congress and reflective of some sense of community
consensus. 3 ' The reliance on a more free-flowing balancing of interests is reflective of a relativist approach to normative principles.
These differences in normative paradigms can be traced directly to the divergent values regarding distribution of resources.
The creditors' bargain theorists support the normative goal of enhanced collective creditor recovery in part upon the notion of contractual entitlements.3 2 The loss allocation theorists support the
128. ALTMAN, supra note 111, at 14-15. Critical legal scholars look at power as an important part of how law defines norms. ALTMAN, supra note 111, at 14-15; see Stephen J.
Schnably, Property and Pragmatism:A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 361 (1993). In the extreme version of skepticism, one confronts the epistimological dilemma of proving how one acquires "knowledge" of anything.
One version of this issue is how do we know that we really exist. See Chow, Trashing,supra
note 103, at 261-62 & n.182. See generally 3 & 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 8-38 (reprinted 1972) (historical account of various epistimological schools of thought).
In partial response to an extreme version of skepticism, some writers are looking at law
as a pragmatic means to identified ends. This view of law does not seek to identify moral
norms and then enforce those norms. Rather, this view of law asks what do we want the law
to address and suggests that the law should then be structured to achieve those ends. See
R.A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990); Singer, supra note 108, at 50103; Summers, supra note 107, at 882-89. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of
Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
Professor Chow advances a slightly more elaborate version of pragmatism drawing into
the ends-means analysis the need for coherence with existing beliefs and traditions. Chow,
supra note 98, at 810-14. But see Raz, supra note 112.
129. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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normative goal of loss distribution in part upon the recognition of
contractual and non-contractual claims to the debtor's assets.1 33
The values that lie beneath the surface of the theories influence
the writers' perspective on whether the law is advancing the "correct" normative paradigm.
C.

Constraining the Decision Maker's Discretion

Many jurisprudential writers address whether the decision
maker's discretion in applying the law in particular cases can be
constrained. The primary concern is whether there is a method of
law that can constrain the discretion of the decision maker in adjudicating disputes so that the adjudicator's own values and beliefs
will not intrude into the application of the law. 3's The basic dichotomy of philosophy is between the realists and the formalists.
The formalistic style of legal reasoning was based upon the
idea that the application of the legal rule to the facts at hand depended solely on reasoning using deductive logic. 135 Essential to a
formalistic type of reasoning is a beginning taxonomy of propositions or classification of concepts.1 36 Some scholars such as Oliver
Wendell Holmes and John H. Wigmore attempted to develop such
classifications. 3 7 This school of thought was heavily influenced by
the idea that law could be a science, with set principles and logical
reasoning from those principles to conclusions in particular
138
cases.
The legal realists attacked this methodology by demonstrating
the indeterminacy of language and the multiplicity of facts that
went into defining the legal rule or the choosing of the particular
legal rule to apply to the facts at hand. 39 This attack focused on
the idea that the judge's own values and beliefs must influence the
133. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
134. See Morawetz, supra note 12, at 389-96; Golding, supra note 107, at 461; Salbu,
supra note 104, at 379-82; Summers, supra note 107, at 909-10. See generally Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 607-08 (1983); P. John Kozyris, In the Cauldron of Jurisprudence: The View From Within The Stew, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 427
(1991); Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey The Law?, 77 GEo. L.J. 113, 115-17
(1988).
135. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions
of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1439, 1445 (1992).
136. Id.
137. HERGET, supra note 98, at 31-116.
138. HERGET, supra note 98, at 12-22; see also BERMAN, supra note 98, at 151-64 (explaining law as deductive legal science); Singer, supra note 108, at 496-99.
139. See, e.g., Golding, supra note 107, at 459-60; Steven J. Burton, Reaffirming Legal
Reasoning: The Challenge From the Left, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 358, 359-63 (1986); Chow,
supra note 98, at 782; Minda, supra note 107, at 633-38; Singer, supra note 108, at 470-71.
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judge's interpretation and application of the law. 14 Thus, the abilthrough legal doctrine and
ity to constrain the judge's discretion
4
1
unattainable.1
is
methodology
The creditors' bargain theorists and loss allocation theorists
also debate if and how the decision maker's discretion should be
constrained. The creditors' bargain theorists attempt to constrain
bankruptcy judges' decision making and application of the law by
criticizing decisions that veer from the creditors' bargain norms
and that do not analyze the bankruptcy issue at hand using the
economic methodology of finding the least costly or creditor wealth
maximizing option.' 2 The creditors' bargain theorists' style of reasoning thus is a formalistic type of reasoning. The loss allocation
theorists, in contrast, do not advocate the use of set normative
principles, other than those embodied in the statute, and deductive
logic from those non-statutory principles to constrain the judges'
decision making. The ability of the judge to use discretion is vital
to the loss allocation belief in the need for a flexible decision
maker doing the best that can be done at the time in this one
case.' 4 The loss allocation theorists' style of reasoning is formalistic when discussing statutory analysis and non-formalistic when
the statute does not provide a clear answer.
The debate about the appropriate range of discretion for the
decision maker is influenced by the beliefs and values of the theorists. The creditors' bargain theorists' beliefs and values outlined
earlier144 lead to a desire to constrain significantly the bankruptcy
judge's discretion in making decisions in particular cases. The
bankruptcy judge's use of power to contradict the will of the credi140. ALTMAN, supra note 111, at 14-15; Chow, supra note 98, at 782-83; Salbu, supra
note 104, at 379-80.
141. ALTMAN, supra note 111, at 14-18; Chow, supra note 98, at 782-83. But see Summers, supra note 107, at 908-16.
142. See supra note 1. In recent times, off-the-shelf formal methods of reasoning from
other disciplines have been applied in legal reasoning as an attempt to provide a yardstick
for acceptable legal reasoning. Perhaps one of the most pervasive uses of a non-legal discipline is the growth of the field called law and economics. Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 53-54 (1992). Economics provides a formalistic style of reasoning
that is viewed as more certain, less open ended and thus a better constraint on judicial
decision making.
For a summary of main tenets of law and economics, see POSNER, supra note 20, at
§§ 1.1-1.3, at 3-17; Thomas S. Ulen, The Lessons of Law and Economics, J. LEGAL ECON.,
Dec. 1992, at 103. For some of the typical criticisms of the principles of law and economics,
see Hovenkamp, supra note 103; Kozyris, supra note 134, at 435-38; Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DuKE L.J. 53 (1992).
143. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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tors is criticized. 1 5 In contrast, the loss allocation theorists' beliefs
and values 146 lead to a view of the bankruptcy judge's discretion as
not only necessary but very desirable.
D.

Justice and the Law

Perhaps the most difficult debate in jurisprudence is the question of justice. This debate involves the writers' visions of what
constitutes a just society. The law itself is held up to the ideal that
it should be an instrument of justice. The law should lead to just
results in particular cases and is deemed a failure or inadequate
when justice does not prevail.
The debate about what is justice, what is a just society, and
whether the law is just, pervades both jurisprudential and philosophical debate. For example, the natural law theorists argue from
their normative principles that societies and laws that compare favorably to those principles are just, whereas those societies and
laws that do not compare favorably are unjust. 14 7 The relativists
have a more difficult time of determining whether a society or law
is just because of the inability to identify a workable criterion of
14 8
justice beyond the consensus of the society itself.
In many ways, ideas about what is a just law are bound up
with the ideas of law's legitimacy, normative paradigm, and methodology. If a law is legitimate, enforcing the correct norms and appropriately constraining the decision maker's discretion, the law is
perceived as just. Just as those jurisprudential questions involve
beliefs and values, ideas of justice involve questions of beliefs and
values about morality and society. These beliefs are about many
things, such as how society should be structured, how individuals
should relate to the community, and how individuals should relate
to other individuals.' 4 9 The debate about justice depends upon the
debaters starting with sets of beliefs and values. The natural law
theorists start with the belief that people are rational beings who
act with free will and ability to make choices to be "moral" or
not.15 The cultural relativists start with the belief that there is no
145. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 1, at 877.
146. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
149. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY
255-72 (1992); Paul G. Haskell, Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1025, 1029 (1991); Kennedy, supra note 94, at 1766-78; Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MicH. L. REV. 2424, 2533 (1992); Pildes, supra note 53, at 1530-45; Stone,
supra note 98, at 865-70.
150. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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set of ultimate beliefs against which to judge another society.151
The debate between the creditors' bargain theorists and the
loss allocation theorists about whether the bankruptcy law is just
is driven by the fundamental differences in the belief and value
systems of the participants in the debate. As described earlier,
those belief systems diverge in four main areas: (i) the nature of a
person, (ii) the nature of the community, (iii) the optimal method
of resource distribution, and (iv) the optimal allocation of decisionmaking power. Because the belief and value systems are so divergent, the writers' visions of what is a just bankruptcy law also diverge. That should be no surprise.
E.

Conclusion

The debate in bankruptcy is a microcosm of the ongoing and
unresolved debate in jurisprudence. Whether the debate uses jurisprudential terms or bankruptcy terms, the theorists' positions depend upon their respective values and beliefs. Nothing that any
theorist has stated leads to a hope that the debate will be resolved
in bankruptcy, any more than the debate will be resolved in jurisprudential thinking as a whole without confronting the underlying
beliefs and values.
V.

VALUES AND BELIEFS IN DEBTOR AND CREDITOR RELATIONSHIPS

To even begin to address the question of the purpose of bankruptcy law, scholars need to begin a forthright debate about the
beliefs and values that lie beneath the words. Instead of debating
doctrinal analysis and normative goals, we should be acknowledging and confronting the beliefs and values that influence that debate. In bankruptcy theory, the beliefs that seem to be the most
basic are those beliefs and values that Professor Shuchman identified almost 20 years ago. 152 Those beliefs and values revolve around
the deceptively simple question, when is someone obligated to pay
or excused from paying a debt.
That question encompasses a whole host of other questions. Is
incurring debt a good or a bad thing? How much debt should be
tolerated? What do we believe about those people who are unable
to pay all of their debts? Should all debts be paid? What do we
believe about those people who want the debts owed to them repaid? Do we value risk taking? When is risk taking to be discouraged? Do we value personal responsibility? When are we willing to
151.
152.

See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
Shuchman, supra note 11.
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relieve someone from that responsibility? Who do we believe is
that "honest, but unfortunate" debtor?
Do the answers to those questions vary on a case-by-case basis? For example, perhaps a business run by a sole proprietor
where the cause of financial distress is an unforeseeable medical
catastrophe should be treated differently than a multimillion dollar company where the cause of financial distress is an overleveraged buyout by a group of insiders. Should society treat those two
scenarios of financial distress with a law based on a one-size-fits-all
mentality or should society treat those scenarios with a law tailored to the individual circumstances? 153 Can society financially afford a balkanized debtor-creditor law which conceivably might allow such individualized treatment?
This list of initial questions is intended to start a conversation
about the beliefs and values in the area of debtor and creditor relations. Once we acknowledge that the debate about bankruptcy jurisprudence is really about our beliefs and values and how those
beliefs and values both converge and diverge, perhaps we can see
the common ground for building a bankruptcy system that will cohere with those beliefs and values to a great enough degree that we
can say that the law is truly just.

153. See LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 1, at 756-59. In many ways, current practice
could be moving toward individualized chapters that address different types of debtors; see
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-31 (1988) (farm debtor reorganization); S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 201 (1993) (proposing Chapter 10 reorganization for small businesses).
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